Have Thousands of FBI Employees Been Asked To Create A Database For Use In Firing FBI Employees?
Don't expect terminations anytime soon -- this seems likely for use by the incoming Attorney General and FBI Director.
By noon today, the Acting Director of the FBI, Brian Driscoll has been directed by the Acting Attorney General Emil Bove to produce information concerning every FBI employee – agent, analyst, supervisor, etc., -- who participated in any investigation related to the events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol. There was a suggestion over the weekend that Driscoll was resisting having to comply with the directive. Here is the message he sent out to the FBI workforce:
To accomplish this tasking, a multi-page questionnaire was sent to FBI employees via email over the weekend. Currently suspended FBI Special Agent Garrett O’Boyle (@GOBactual) posted the questionnaire on his “X” page. The questions are quite short and straightforward. I don’t read them as either an invitation to go “snitching” on fellow employees/management, nor does the information required lead directly to a firing squad. The questions don’t require much detail about the employee’s involvement in individual January 6 case(s) — that portion of the disclosure is a “check the box” kind of entry. Most of the options are rather ordinary and routine kinds of work that is the scut work of FBI employees on a daily basis.
Something also not known at this point is whether this questionnaire was created by FBI internally, or whether it was created by DOJ and sent to FBI to use.
The nature of the questions seems more indicative of the new Trump DOJ/FBI wanting to build a database of information about who did what, when, why, and how. This kind of database will be helpful to new management in evaluating the work force they are inheriting, as well as some “ with some specifics about job performance of individual employees over the past 4 years.
Here is a screenshot of the first page:
Noting earth shattering there EXCEPT — the person answering the questions first identifies their current level of authority inside the FBI, and that provides needed context for all the answers that follow.
This is going to be used to determine the “decision-makers,” both in the context of their position, and then what they describe in the answers the next six questions about what they did.
This initial inquiry also sets the bar for the “duty of candor.” The higher up in the chain of command, the greater the obligation to disclose all material information. A supervisor or manager who gives only cursory answers of little value to those assembling this database will likely be scrutinized more carefully. Discrepancies between what the individual did, and what information is found elsewhere about that they individual did will likely wreck careers.
Here is the second page of the questionnaire:
These questions further group the respondents. The first question will primarily divide respondents into three categories — Agents, Analysts, and Support Staff. The three questions after that establish what level of authority the individual had four years ago when the investigation first began. There may be some obfuscation in answers to the last three because promotions and transfers happen, job duties change, and level of responsibility likely goes up — particularly for supervisors.
So, even through the first 8 questions, the questionnaire has not yet generated any meaningful information about individual FBI personnel and their involvement in one or more January 6 cases.
Here are the next two questions from the questionnaire posted by Garrett O’Boyle:
This one really does nothing except generate some geographic data.
Under-appreciated by the public at large is the extent to which the FBI is a stat-driven bureaucracy — pretty much the same as any other government agency. Stats are the “metrics” by which management is evaluated. Those evaluations determine bonuses and promotion options.
Here are the FBI’s enforcement priorities: Terrorism, Counterintelligence, Cybercrime, Public Corruption, Civil Rights, Transnational Organized Crime, White Collar Crime, and Violent Crime.
The Biden DOJ determined that anti-government “domestic extremism” was the top “terrorism” threat facing the country. Inside the FBI that generated a “stat race” to open cases that reflected the new priorities.
The events of January 6, if recast in the public consciousness as a violent assault by anti-government extremists — rather than a political protest gone out of control — became the vehicle to generate stats to make the FBI and DOJ look good to Congress and the White House, and for all ranks of management inside the FBI to make themselves look good to their superiors. For those in the ranks of employees looking to advance their careers, volunteering to pursue January 6 cases was one way to draw attention to yourself.
It is likely too broad a sweep to say that a large portion of the FBI Special Agent work force was involved in January 6 cases. The cases tended to be assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force(s) (JTTF) in each Field Office, and nearly all the Case Agents I had in cases were JTTF members. In an odd fashion this is going to provide some insulation for FBI Special Agents because my own experience was that about 1 in 5 “Case Agents” were actually state or local law enforcement officers assigned to the FBI JTTF — and not FBI Agents. Those individuals might be removed from JTTF but they won’t be fired by Kash Patel or anyone in DOJ— they don’t work for the FBI.
The next two questions are the only ones that address what specific role individual FBI employees played in the January 6 cases they worked on.
As noted above, Question 11 only involves box-checking — it does not ask for an explanation of the work actually done. It seems dubious to me that an employee is going to have their job placed in jeopardy based on checking a box. But what this question does, like others I referenced above, is again narrow the list of those who might be in line for a performance review.
Among the 15 listed activities, probably only 6 will present a justification for a more in-depth look. My guesses:
Arrest, led operation.
Assigned as Case Agent.
HQ program management support.
Search warrant, led operation.
Supervised squad.
Testified at trial.
The trouble will be found in the details with regard to having played a role with any of the above six.
Finally, Question Twelve is going to address the issue of when the “offending conduct” might have taken place. An Employee involved in a single January 6 case for only a few months in early 2021 is unlikely to get the same amount of scrutiny as an Agent who handled more than a single case and remained part of the larger investigation for months or years even.
The limited information that the answers to these questions will produce seems more likely to generate a potential witness list than a target list. The targets are more likely to be in management than in the work force. While the data gathered from the questionnaire will certainly generate some “incriminating” information with regard to individual FBI employees, it seems much more likely to be a starting point than an ending point.
Epilogue — Just as I was finishing this article CNN reported that the FBI Acting Director did respond with the information by today’s deadline. More than 5000 FBI employees were listed as having played some role — in response to the questions above — in the handling of January 6 cases. CNN notes that this number compares to the overall FBI work force of 38,000, including 13,000 Special Agents. The CNN story does not specify how many of the 5000 employees involved were Special Agents.
Ship, great information. Thanks for the work you put into it.
5k out of 38k seems like an excessively large amount of resources were applied to J6. I, too, see the questionnaire more about documentation of what leadership was doing with agency resources and why rather than slapping frontline workers. I am naive, but when I worked, I always felt if I wasn't proud of a work action I was assigned to be involved in, I declined participating. That kind of approach did slow my promotions and rise in the LE agency I worked in, but I still rose up and maintained my integrity. I was able to retire after 40 years with my head held high and not having to look over my shoulder.